account balance, and a cautionary word from the Japanese Ministry of Finance dropped the dollar to 111 yen, apparently ending the cycle.
Such dramatic exchange rate fluctuations can present serious problems for the economies of the nations affected. [THIS PARAGRAPH NEEDS AMPLIFYING.]
The tradables sector is most directly affected. An overvalued currency puts the squeeze on exporters, an undervalued one, on importers. Profit margins suffer from currency volatility, which also complicates investment planning.
The 1995-96 yen-dollar dustup elicited the predictable calls for international monetary reform. If the major industrialized countries that make up the Group of 7 could only agree to establish a new system of pegged-butadjustable currencies or exchange rate target zones, observers argued, these painful exchange rate fluctuations could be avoided. And if the seven could not reach agreement as a group, then the countries whose currencies were being affected should establish a bilateral target zone.
The matter, unfortunately, is not so simple. Stabilizing exchange rates through establishing a new international monetary system of pegs, bands, or target zones would require significant compromises of domestic policy autonomy. Intervention by central banks is effective only if it sends credible signals of future shifts in monetary and fiscal policies--that is, when there 2 is no conflict between domestic and international economic policies.
But in today's world, conflicts between domestic and international economic objectives are inevitable, and they will inevitably defeat efforts to maintain currency pegs. The removal of controls on international capital movements and the development of modern information-processing technologies over the past several decades permit billions of dollars to be traded across borders at the stroke of a key. The domestic policy independence that capital controls once afforded national monetary and fiscal authorities has become a thing of the past. Currency traders, no longer limited by controls, are free to attack an exchange rate as soon as they begin to suspect that the government is less than totally committed to defending it--a practice that can greatly increase the cost of defending the currency peg. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of dominant political coalitions in countries like Italy and Japan, governments are necessarily fragile and hesitant to put the domestic economy through the wringer to defend the exchange rate at any cost. Weak governments find it infeasible to pursue the international economic policies needed to maintain a durable currency peg.
Thus schemes to peg the dollar, the yen, and the deutschmark against one another, as had been the practice until the Bretton Woods international monetary system collapsed in the early 1970s, will prove unavailing. Exchange rates between these currencies will continue to float against each other.
For United States and Japan, large countries that remain relatively closed to international transactions, this arrangement, while painful, is bearable. For small open economies, where a larger share of production is typically sold on international markets, the dislocations caused by exchange rate swings can be excruciating. Because the financial sector is small relative to global financial markets, a shift in market sentiment or in interest rates in the United States can elicit a flood of capital inflows that lead to a dramatic real appreciation or massive outflows that cause the exchange rate to depreciate alarmingly.
Whether these small open economies are in Europe, Latin America, or East Asia, they find it exceedingly difficult to live with exchange rate fluctuations. They are thus prepared to take drastic steps to limit exchange rate volatility. In Western Europe, such steps include the effort to establish 
